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I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Helen Marasco (hereinafter "Mrs. 
Marasco"), and the Appellee, Joane Pappas White (hereinafter "Pappas White"). 
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IV. 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j). Jurisdiction is now properly vested in the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Pappas White's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissing Mrs. Marasco's complaint for professional negligence 
against Pappas White? 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In 
determining whether the trial court correctly found that there was no genuine 
issue of material fact, we review the facts and inferences from them in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. We review the conclusions of law for 
correctness and give no deference to the trial court. Larson v. Overland Thrift 
and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991) citations omitted. 
Additionally,' [f]or moving party to be entitled to summary judgment, it must 
establish a right to judgment based upon the applicable law as applied to the 
undisputed facts. 3D Construction and Development v. Old Standard Life 
Insurance Co., 2005 Utah App. 277. Quoting Smith v. Four Corners Health 
Center. Inc.. 70 P.3d 904 (Utah 2003). 
"[W]e resolve all doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in 
court on the merits of a controversy." Brigham Young University v. Tremco 
Consultants. Inc.. 2005 UT 19 (Utah 2005.). 
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2. Was summary judgment appropriate based upon issue preclusion, a.k.a., collateral 
estoppel? 
The four elements of issue preclusion, of which all four elements must be met to 
support such a finding, are as follows: 
1. The party against whom an issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party 
to or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication. 
2. The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action. 
3. The issue in the first action must have been completely, fully and fairly 
litigated. 
4. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 3D 
Construction and Development v. Old Standard Life Insurance Co., 2005 Utah 
App. 277 U 27 (Utah 2005). 
"The trial court's determination of whether res judicata bars an action presents 
a question of law... [which] we...review for correctness." Macris & Assoc. Inc. 
v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93 f^ 17. "We review such questions for correctness, 
according no particular deference to the trial court." Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 2006 
UT App 326,18. 
If any one of these requirements is not satisfied, there can be no preclusion. 
Hill v. First National Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 245 (Utah 1992). The burden of 
establishing each of the elements of res judicata is on Zufelt, the party 
invoking the doctrine in this case." Zufelt, Id, f^ 9. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 56 (c) of the U.R.Civ.P. is the sole determinative authority on appeal. 
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Rule 56 (c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Mrs. Marasco brought this action to recover damages for legal malpractice 
when Pappas White, in her role as attorney for Mrs. Marasco, failed to file an action to set 
aside or amend a deed with a mistake in the deed description within the three-year statute of 
limitations. Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3). 
Pappas White filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging issue preclusion or 
collateral estoppel upon the claim of mistake. The basis of her argument was that the issue 
of mistake had been decided in a prior proceeding, and therefore her failure to file an action 
to set aside or amend the deed caused no damage to Mrs. Marasco, and thus, there was no 
legal malpractice committed by her. 
B. Course of Proceedings at Trial Court Level. 
Mrs. Marasco filed her complaint on December 11, 2006. Judge James L. Shumate 
was assigned to the matter after recusal by Judge Lyle Anderson. Appellee filed her answer 
on February 5. 2007. A Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum was 
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filed by Appellee on May 21, 2007. Appropriate responsive memorandums were filed 
respectively on July 2, 2007 by Mrs. Marasco and July 18, 2007 by Appellee. Oral 
arguments were heard before the Honorable James L. Shumate on October 4,2007 with the 
bench granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that day. An Order of Dismissal 
was signed on November 6, 2007 by Judge Shumate with the Order being entered on 
November 16, 2007. Notice of Appeal was filed on December 13, 2007. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Helen Marasco is a widow whose husband died in 1992 and she inherited the 
bulk of his estate. (Record at 65, #1.) 
In January 1993 Mrs. Marasco had in place an estate plan with a will and trust 
giving her estate equally to her two children, Terry Marasco and Trudy 
Markosek. (Record at 65, # 2.) 
Mrs. Marasco met with Richard H. Bradley, a Salt Lake City, Utah attorney, 
in mid-1999 for discussions about amendments to her estate plan. (Record at 
65, #3.) 
On October 1, 1999 Mrs. Marasco signed and had recorded with the Carbon 
County Recorder a Quit Claim Deed giving her home, real property and 
surrounding acreage of approximately 7.5 acres located at 3545 North 1130 
West, Helper, Utah to her son, Terry Marasco. (Record at 65, # 4, and 114, 
#2.) 
5. On November 30, 1999 Mrs. Marasco signed a new will and trust completed 
by Richard H. Bradley. (Record at 65, # 5.) 
6. Mrs. Marasco had some questions about the will and trust and contacted 
attorney Nick Sampinos of Price, Utah who she considered her family attorney. 
Mr. Sampinos discovered, by his review of the Carbon County Recorder's 
records, that the Quit Claim Deed signed on October 1,1999 by Mrs. Marasco 
had transferred her home, yard and surrounding farm acreage and out-
buildings to her son, Terry Marasco. This information was relayed to her on 
January 20, 2000. (Record at 65, # 6 and 128 p 38 line 1 to p 39 line 5.) 
7. Mrs. Marasco became very upset when this was explained to her because it 
was her intent to keep the home and surrounding yard for herself and her trust, 
and give only the farm acreage and out-buildings to her son, Terry Marasco. 
(Record at 65, # 7, Record 128 p 38, line 24 to p 39 line 5.) 
8. Mr. Sampinos, due to other professional duties, and to avoid a conflict of 
interest, discussed the matter with attorney, Joane Pappas White, Appellee. 
(Record at 66, # 8, Record at 128, p 39 line 6 to line 20.) 
9. Mr. Sampinos sent a letter to Pappas White on March 30, 2000 regarding the 
matter. (Record at 135-6.) 
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10. Pappas White was subsequently retained by Mrs. Marasco and an 
attorney/client relationship was established between Mrs. Marasco and 
defendant regarding the matter of the wrongfully executed deed and other legal 
matters. (Record at 138-145.) 
11. Pappas White sent letters to various parties indicating that she was the attorney 
representing Mrs. Marasco in the matter of the wrongfully described deed and 
other legal matters. In these letters the deed and a lawsuit regarding this deed 
were specifically referenced. (Record at 138-148.) 
12. There is a three-year statute of limitations upon mistake and fraud claims in the 
State of Utah. (Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26(3)). 
13. Mrs. Marasco discovered that Pappas White had failed to file an action to set 
aside or amend the quit-claim deed upon the basis of mistake within the three-
year statute of limitations which had run on October 2, 2002. 
14. Mrs. Marasco then hired attorneys, Sarah Henry and Ned Stone, to represent 
her in the matter and an action for return of the property was filed against her 
son, Terry Marasco, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, Carbon County, 
Utah under Helen Marasco v. Terry Marasco (hereinafter referred to "the 
Marasco case") Case No. 030700583 before the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner. 
(Record at 113-121.) 
15. The causes of action relied upon in the Marasco case to set aside or amend the 
deed were (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty, (4) fraud, (5) mistake, (6) constructive trust, and (7) quiet title. (Record 
at 118, #1.) 
16. The court in the Marasco case dismissed as time-barred the claims of fraud and 
mistake. (Record at 86 lines 15-17, record atl04 lines 6-9, record at 115, # 10, 
and record at 120, # 12, record at 104, lines 3-9.) 
17. The Marasco court dismissed on the merits the five surviving causes of action 
alleging that there was no "inequitable conduct by the defendant [Terry 
Marasco]55 to invalidate the deed. (Record at 120-121, #16.) 
18. Findings of Fact (hereinafter "FOF55) and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter 
"COL")(collectively "FOFCOL55) and an appropriate Order were drawn up by 
Terry Marasco's attorneys, D. David Lambert and Helen H. Anderson, and 
submitted and signed by the court. (Record at 113-121.) 
19. No appeal was taken by the parties in the Marasco case. 
20. This action for professional malpractice against Pappas White for failing to set 
aside or amend the deed within the three-year statute of limitations upon 
mistake was then filed on December 11, 2006 by Appellant, Helen Marasco 
through counsel, William R. Hadley. (Record at 1-8.) 
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21. Pappas White entered her defense and submitted an answer and Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of collateral estoppel alleging that 
the issue of mistake had previously been decided in the Marasco case, and that 
because of such prior decision, no legal malpractice was committed by Pappas 
White. (Record at 9-17 and 27 to 61.) 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. There are not sufficient facts or findings to determine whether or not Mrs. 
Marasco desired to transfer all of the real property and buildings to her son. The Marasco 
FOFCOL were silent or confusing in this regard and this raises a question of material fact, 
and thus summary judgment was inappropriate. 
B. Only one of the four elements of issue preclusion were met of the four and 
summary judgment was inappropriate. 
The first element of privity of parties was met. 
Element two was not met as the issues decided in the prior adjudication were causes 
of action alleging (1) undue influence; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; 
(4) constructive trust; and (5) quiet title. This is a cause of action alleging professional 
negligence by Appellee and is not identical to the prior claims. 
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The FOFCOL from the Marasco case were not clear in whether the claim of mistake 
was fully, fairly and completely litigated in the Marasco case. The Marasco FOFCOL and 
references throughout the record indicate that the claim of mistake was time-barred, and thus 
by inference, complete, full and fair testimony was not taken upon the issue of mistake, thus, 
the third element of issue preclusion is not met. 
Prior to evidence being taken, Judge Bryner in Marasco ruled the issues of mistake 
and fraud were barred by the statute of limitations. Although the remaining five actions 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits, it was impossible for the claims of mistake and 
fraud to come to a final judgment on the merits due to their dismissal and the fourth element 
of issue preclusion is not met. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate and this case should be remanded to the district 
court for trial. 
ARGUMENT A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE 
THERE ARE UNCERTAINTIES, DOUBTS OR INFERENCES 
UPON ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
To affirm a summary judgment an appeals court must review and resolve any disputed 
or questionable facts, uncertainties, doubts or inferences regarding issues of material fact in 
favor of the losing party. Id. Larson and 3D Construction. Thus, there must be no question 
9 
or doubt that the appellant unequivocally desired to transfer both the farm and residence to 
her son. This just cannot be proven by the Marasco FOFCOL. 
Appellant's brief argued that "These findings and conclusions are at the least 
confusing, vague and inconsistent." (App. Brief, p. 12). 
Appellee argues that this was new argument that was not raised at the trial court level 
and should be barred. (Opp. Brief, p. 12). 
However, the Marasco FOFCOL speaks for itself in its confusing, vague and 
inconsistent terms. And if such inconsistencies and disputed facts are found, summary 
judgment is inappropriate. 
FOF #4 and #5 state: 
#4 "Helen Marasco stated in her testimony that she intended to make a lifetime 
transfer of the farm portion of the property to her son, Terry Marasco." 
(Emphasis added.) (Record at 114.) 
#5 "Helen Marasco claims that the deed contained a mistake in the description 
and that only the farm portion of the property should have been included in the 
transfer." (Underline added.) (Record at 114.) 
And FOF #10 declares: 
"Helen's testimony was consistent with [attorney] Richard Bradley's except 
that she testified that she only wanted to transfer the farm and not the 
residence." This raises a question of mistake, not a question of undue 
influence, and before taking evidence the court ruled that the claim of mistake 
is time-barred." (Underline added.) (Record at 115.) 
And then COL # 9, #10 and #12 state that: 
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#9 "Because she intended to transfer the farm by the deed in question, the 
plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption of intent created by the deed." 
(Underline added.) (Record at 119). 
#10 "Thus, the claim under the facts presented is that of mistake in the deed 
description." (Record at 119). 
#12 "Any claims of mistake or fraud are time-barred by Utah Code Annotated 
78-12-26(3)." 
The court in Marasco continually refers to "mistake" throughout the FOFCOL and yet 
consistently and repeatedly states that before evidence was taken the issue was time-barred. 
The Marasco court could not rule in appellant's favor on the issue of mistake even if every 
fact was in her favor as the mistake claim had been dismissed as time-barred. 
The court then goes on and rules upon the five surviving causes of action and in COL 
#16 states: 
"There is no legal or factual basis to grant plaintiff relief from the deed under 
her theories of unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, or constructive 
trust, and title to the Property is quieted in the defendant subject to the life 
estate described above by plaintiff nor is there any inequitable conduct by 
defendant upon which to base a decision to invalidate the deed on any 
ground." (Record at 121.) 
The Marasco court ruled only upon the five alternative theories regarding inequitable 
or unfair conduct by her son, Terry Marasco, to obtain the property. Nowhere does the 
Marasco court in its FOFCOL state specifically in terms that are not undisputed, vague, 
confusing or inconsistent with other statements in the document that Mrs. Marasco did not 
make a mistake in transferring both the farm and the residence to her son. 
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These inconsistencies and doubts arising from this document leave ripe an issue of 
material fact that must be resolved in favor of the appellant. Thus, summary judgment 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT B 
THE FOUR ELEMENTS OF ISSUE PRECLUSION 
WERE NOT MET UPON THE MISTAKE CLAIM 
Appellee argues that the third element of issue preclusion (".. .issue in first action must 
have been completely, fully and fairly litigated") was met in Marasco. There is no question 
that the judgment was final and a presumption of regularity applies to the judgment. 
However, the issue of mistake could not "have been completely, fully and fairly litigated" 
as it was dismissed by the court as time-barred. (FOF #10 Record atl 15, and COL #12 at 
120.) Thus, the third element of issue preclusion is not met, and summary judgment was 
inappropriate. 
The fourth element of collateral estoppel is "The first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits." In invoking the defense of collateral estoppel it is critical to keep 
in mind that this defense "...does not apply to issues that merely 'could have been tried' in 
the prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case." 
International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979). 
In Marasco there was a final judgment on the merits of only 5 causes of action that 
survived, those being: (1) undue influence, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) breach of fiduciary 
duty, (4) constructive trust, and (5) quiet title. The mistake and fraud claims were dismissed 
12 
as time-barred, and thus, they were not taken to a "...final judgment on the merits." Thus, 
the fourth element of collateral estoppel is not met. 
Finally, Appellee barely touches upon element two of issue preclusion, in their 
opposition brief. 
#2 "The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action." 
The instant action is a case of professional malpractice by the appellant against the appellee 
for failure to file a cause of action alleging mistake in the deed in a proper and timely manner 
within the two-year statute of limitations. Whether or not the issue of mistake was decided 
in the first claim is a defense to be asserted by the appellee. This defense is a "smoke screen" 
for the appellee's negligence in her failure to timely file an action to set aside the original 
Marasco deed. 
Had appellee performed her professional duties for her client, the appellant, the issue 
of mistake would have been "completely, fully and fairly litigated" in a timely manner. But 
for appellee's negligence, the issue of mistake as time-barred would never have arisen 
resulting in two subsequent lawsuits and this appeal. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The Marasco FOFCOL are ripe with inconsistencies and confusing terms. This 
confusion and disputed facts raises doubts or uncertainties that are sufficient to reverse the 
summary judgment when these confusing and disputed statements are looked at in a light 
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most favorable to the non-moving/losing party and Utah courts are in favor of resolving the 
merits of a controversy and allowing parties to have their day in court. Id. Brigham Young 
University. 
To affirm summary judgment in this case would be condoning the professional 
negligence of the appellee. Attorney Pappas-White knew for over 2-1/2 years that this deed 
needed to be set aside. Instead, appellee allowed the statute of limitations to run on 
appellant's claim rather than file a routine and simple action to set aside the deed. 
Justice and equity require that this court bar the appellee's defense of collateral 
estoppel and reverse summary judgment and remand this case back to the district court for 
trial upon the claim of appellee's professional negligence. 
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Respectfully submitted this / day of October, 2008. 
/ 
S/K j/^4 
*z> 
WILLIAM R. HADLE 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT this ? day of October, 2008, to the 
following: 
Michael F. Skolnick 
KIPP and CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
WILLIAM R. HADLEY 
Attorney at Law 
15 
